University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2013

Alappat Redux: Support for Functional Language in Software
Patent Claims
Andrew Chin
University of North Carolina School of Law, chin@unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Southern Methodist University Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

ALAPPAT REDUX: SUPPORT FOR
FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE IN SOFTWARE
PATENT CLAIMS
Andrew Chin*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit has suggested in some recent cases that any algorithm can serve as adequate structuralsupportfor a means-plus-function
element in a software patent claim under § 112(f). A recent proposal by
Mark Lemley fully endorses this propositionand seeks its broaderapplication. The concept of an algorithm, however, is too slippery to serve as the
basis for such a rule. In this Article, I argue that this overreliance on the
algorithm concept originatedin a revisionistgloss on the Federal Circuit's
1994 Alappat decision. Informed by a closer reading of what Alappat actually has to say about claim construction under § 112(f), I propose a more
stable "concrete causation" standardthat is not only applicable to all technologies, but also well-aligned with the reforms in the software field intended by Lemley's proposal.

THE
I.

RECENT SCRUTINY OF FUNCTIONAL CLAIMING

alleged systemic failure of software patent claims to provide

notice of their scope has received considerable attention in recent
years. According to the authors of PatentFailure:How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk, "the abstractness of
software technology inherently makes it more difficult to place limits on
abstract claims in software patents."' To characterize all software technology as problematically abstract, however, is to paint it with too broad
a brush.
As I argued in a 2009 symposium volume on Patent Failure, even the
book's examples of allegedly abstract patent claims are amenable to reasonably straightforward determinations of claim scope. 2 To be more specific, abstractions in most of these example-claims no longer appear to be
* Associate Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Keith Robinson, Simone Rose, and Hilda Galvan for helpful discussions;
and the organizers and editors for their exemplary efforts in producing an outstanding
symposium program.
1. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BuREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS Pur INNOVATORS AT RISK 201 (2008).
2. See Andrew Chin, On Abstraction and Equivalencein Software Patent Doctrine: A
Response to Bessen, Meurer and Klemens, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 197, 200 (2009).
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problematic once they are properly interpreted as "means-plus-function"
or "step-plus-function" elements 3 in accordance with § 112(f) of the Patent Act. 4 Under this statutory provision, patent claims that use functional
language to describe kinds of structures, materials, or acts are not to be
construed as encompassing all such means or steps capable of performing
the described function; instead, they should be interpreted narrowly to
cover only the particular means or steps that are described in the patent
specification and equivalents thereof.5
This rule of narrow construction, in which abstract functional claim language is replaced with concrete particular structures, materials, or acts, is
a potentially powerful safeguard against overbreadth and uncertainty in
the scope of software patent claims. In a recent article, Software Patents
and the Return of Functional Claiming,Mark Lemley has gone so far as to
argue that a more assiduous application of § 112(f) to functional language
in software patent claims might be enough to address most contemporary
objections to software patents "with one fell swoop." 6
I applaud Lemley's call for means-plus-function and step-plus-function
claim elements to be faithfully identified and narrowly construed in accordance with statute. In this Article, however, I will argue that the application of § 112(f) brings into play potential ambiguities in the
specification of supporting structures, materials, and acts. The pressing
need to resolve these ambiguities in the wake of Bilski v. Kappos7 calls
for a careful review of the Federal Circuit's case law on the construction
of software means-plus-function and step-plus-function claims. In particular, a 1994 Federal Circuit en banc decision, In re Alappat,8 warrants
prominent consideration as a § 112(f) precedent. While Alappat is better
known in the annals of software patent law as a once-important precedent on the patent eligibility of programmed computers under § 101,9 a
close reading of the decision shows that its force in the § 112(f) context
3. See id. at 224.
4. Section 112(f) provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Section 112(f) is the 2011 recodification of § 112, 6; the newer designation will be used to
refer to the provision throughout this Article.
5. See id.
6. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
Wisc. L. REv. 905, 909.
7. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
8. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogatedby In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 93 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
9. A plurality of the Federal Circuit has recently questioned Alappat's continuing
relevance in the patent-eligibility context. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d
1269, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Lourie, J. concurring) (per curiam) ("Not only has
the world of technology changed, but the legal world has changed. The Supreme Court has
spoken since Alappat on the question of patent eligibility, and we must take note of that
change.").
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remains undiminished, warranting an even narrower construction of
many software claims than that urged by Lemley.
This Article's conclusions are immediately applicable to questions recently posed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's recently created
Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software Related Patents
("Software Partnership").' 0 In February 2013, Patent Office officials convened public discussions in Silicon Valley and New York City focused
primarily on the topic of establishing clear boundaries for software related patent claims that use functional language." At the heart of the
agency's inquiries was the sufficiency of structural disclosure to support
and define the scope of claims that recite functional language.1 2 Several
commenters at the discussions noted parallels between the Patent Office's software initiative and the public comment process that accompanied the agency's development of the 2001 Utility Examination
Guidelines,' 3 specifically addressing the patentability of DNA molecules.14 It therefore appears to many observers that the Patent Office is
preparing to take up Lemley's proposal even before the article's journal
10. Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292-93 (Jan. 3, 2013).
11. See id. at 294. Specifically, most presenters (including the author) addressed the
following questions:
1. When means-plus-function style claiming under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) is used in
software-related claims, indefinite claims can be divided into two distinct
groups: claims where the specification discloses no corresponding structure;
and claims where the specification discloses structure but that structure is
inadequate. In order to specify adequate structure and comply with 35 U.S.C.
112(b), an algorithm must be expressed in sufficient detail to provide means
to accomplish the claimed function. In general, are the requirements of 35
U.S.C. 112(b) for providing corresponding structure to perform the claimed
function typically being complied with by applicants and are such requirements being applied properly during examination? In particular:
(a) Do supporting disclosures adequately define any structure corresponding to the claimed function?
(b) If some structure is provided, what should constitute sufficient 'structural' support?
(c) What level of detail of algorithm should be required to meet the sufficient structure requirement?
2. In software-related claims that do not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) but do recite functional language, what would constitute sufficient definiteness under
35 U.S.C. 112(b) in order for the claim boundaries to be clear? In particular:
(a) Is it necessary for the claim element to also recite structure sufficiently
specific for performing the function?
(b) If not, what structural disclosure is necessary in the specification to
clearly link that structure to the recited function and to ensure that the
bounds of the invention are sufficiently demarcated?
3. Should claims that recite a computer for performing certain functions or
configured to perform certain functions be treated as invoking 35 U.S.C.
112(f) although the elements are not set forth in conventional means-plusfunction format?
See id.
12. See id.
13. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
14. See J. Timothy Meigs, Biotechnology Patent Prosecution in View of PTO's Utility
Examination Guidelines, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 451, 458-68 (2001)
(describing development of guidelines by the Patent Office).
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publication' 5 and looking to § 112(f) as the principal policy lever to curb
perceived overbreadth and indefiniteness due to abstraction in software
patent claims.
If and when the Patent Office develops guidelines with the aim of
promulgating a robust legal standard for supporting "structure" under
§ 112(f), the devil will be in the details. As this Article will explain, a
careful reading of the Federal Circuit's Alappat decision can provide guidance to the agency on this increasingly pivotal issue in the examination
of software patent claims.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Section II describes Lemley's proposal in the context of previous commentary and relevant caselaw. Section III explains the Alappat majority's approach to
claim construction under § 112(f) and points out the court's divergence
from both Lemley's interpretation and a gloss offered by the Federal Circuit in its subsequent WMS Gaming decision. 16 Drawing from Alappat's
insights, Section IV proposes, in the spirit of a friendly amendment to
Lemley's proposal, a "concrete causation" standard for supporting "structure" under § 112(f). Section V concludes with additional arguments in
support of my proposal.
II.

LEMLEY'S PROPOSAL

One of Bessen and Meurer's examples of a problematically abstract
software patent was a 1988 patent granted to AT&T Bell Labs's Narendra Karmarkar for improved "[m]ethods and apparatus for efficient resource allocation."1 7 Karmarkar's patent specification discloses, interalia,
a new algorithm for solving linear programming problems (a fundamental
computational problem in operations research) in considerably less time
than previous methods.' 8 As I described in my 2009 response to Bessen
and Meurer, Karmarkar's breakthrough involved the use of a novel "interior-point" projective transformation to search iteratively for solutions to
a given problem, in contrast with prior art "exterior-point" methods. 19 I
noted that nineteen of Karmarkar's twenty-two independent claims contained functional language, such as "normalizing," "selecting," and
"transforming," without reciting supporting structure, material, or acts.2 0
15. See, e.g., John R. Harris, Patent Office to Explore Ways to Improve Quality of
Software Patents, MMM TECH L. & Bus. REP., http://www.mmmtechlaw.com/?p=6825 (last
visited Sept. 1, 2013) (describing Topic 1 as "stem[ming] from" Lemley, supra note 6);
Pamela Jones, Groklaw's Response to the USPTO on the First Topic 2 & n.1 (Feb. 10,
2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sw-e.groklaw-topicl_20130210.pdf
(citing Lemley, supra note 6); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Troll Panel at Yale Law
School, PATENTLY-O (May 14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/patenttroll-panel-at-yale-law-school.html (noting citation of Lemley, supra note 6 in presentation
by USPTO Deputy Solicitor Nathan Kelley).
16. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
17. U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028 (filed Apr. 19, 1985) (issued May 10, 1988).
18. See id.
19. See Chin, supra note 2, at 214-23 (describing Karmarkar's contributions).
20. Id.
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Therefore, it should be construed narrowly as means-plus-function claims
or step-plus-function claims in accordance with § 112(f). 2 1 Accordingly, I
concluded that these claims should "be limited in scope to algorithms that
implement a projective transformation as described in the
specification." 2 2
It is possible to read Karmarkar's claims more broadly. While § 112(f)
of the Patent Act by its terms is applicable whenever an element of a
claim is described in functional terms "without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof,"2 3 the Federal Circuit has tended to
limit application of the provision to cases where "in the selection of claim
language, the patentee must be taken to have exercised that option." 24
Thus, for Chief Judge Rader at least, the applicability of § 112(f) does not
turn on the sufficiency or insufficiency of supporting structure for a functionally described element; the correct inquiry is whether the claim was
drafted "advisedly to invoke the statutory mandates for means-plus-function clauses." 25
Since practitioners generally prefer to use the term "means" to signify
an intention to draft a claim that falls under § 112(f), 26 a court may be
reluctant to construe a claim element as a means-plus-function clause if it
does not expressly recite the term "means." 27 Similarly, the absence of
the phrase "step for" in a process claim may raise a judicial presumption
against a step-plus-function construction. 2 8 In contrast, in my 2009 article,
I called for the application of § 112(f) to several of Karmarkar's independent process claims that-in my view-contain functional language without reciting supporting structure, material, or acts, even though there is
no "step for" phrase to signify intent to draft in step-plus-function
format. 29
Along similar lines, Lemley describes his proposed approach to the application of § 112(f) in terms of textual fidelity to the statute:
We don't need to change the statute to achieve this result. We
don't even need to overrule existing cases. We just need to take seriously law that is on the books but doesn't seem to get applied in
21. See id. at 224. § 112, 6 was recodified as § 112(f) in 2011.
22. See id.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
24. See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
25. See Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (citing York Prods. Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
26. See ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
§ 3:29.8, at 3-113 (2009) ("To be sure you are under section 112, paragraph 6, use the pure
'means for . . . .' Other words lead to ambiguity and the need for a court to decide.").
27. See, e.g., Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1584 ("Nonetheless, the use of the term 'means' has
come to be so closely associated with 'means-plus-function' claiming that it is fair to say
that the use of the term 'means' . . . generally invokes section 112(6) and that the use of a
different formulation generally does not.").
28. See Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Med. Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
29. Compare Chin, supra note 2, at 225-26, with U.S. Patent No. 4,744,028, cls. 1, 3, 15,
16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36 (filed Apr. 19, 1985).
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practice. The Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court could, with one
fell swoop, do away with most of the problem of overclaiming in
software patents-and with it, most of the problems with software
patents. All it needs to do is to take the statute at face value and
limit functional claims to the particular way the patentee implemented that function. 30
Though Lemley does not so state, his proposal would dispense with the
issue of whether the patentee intended to draft a claim subject to the
provisions of § 112(f). For Lemley, every patent claim that uses functional
language must be -limited in scope "to the actual structure, material, or
acts the patentee built or described," 31 whether or not it includes the
"means for" or "step for" phrase as a signifier of the claim drafter's
intent. 32
Lemley also explains what his proposal would entail in the case of a
patent claim directed to a general-purpose computer programmed to perform a sequence of functional steps. According to Lemley, in such a
claim, "the 'structure' or 'acts' that perform the [recited] function are not
33
simply 'a computer' but 'a computer programmed in a particular way.'"
Thus, the scope of such a claim should be "limited to that particular computer program and ones that work in the same way to achieve the same
result." 34 In other words, "patentees will have to disclose the algorithms
they use to achieve particular ends, and the patent will be limited to those
algorithms and equivalents thereof."3 5
While Lemley argues persuasively that the functional elements of
software patent claims should be construed narrowly in accordance with
disclosures in the accompanying patent specification, his proposal to focus on disclosed algorithms does not fully address the Patent Office's call
for standards regarding the sufficiency of structural disclosure. This is because the question of which "algorithms [are] use[d] to achieve particular
ends" is so often an indeterminate inquiry. 36
The term "algorithm" can refer to any "finite sequence of steps" that
accomplishes a given task.37 As an algorithm is usually described in computer science literature, it is common for some or all of the "steps" themselves to be tasks that can be decomposed further into sequences of more
basic steps. A computer system thereby typically involves numerous "abstraction layers," with each successive, more abstract layer implementing
its own set of functions through various algorithms comprising sequences
30. Lemley, supra note 6, at 947-48.
31. Id. at 947.
32. See id. at 944-46.
33. See id. at 947.
34. See id. at 948.
35. Id. at 947.
36. Id.
37. See MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICrIONARY 19 (1999) (defining "algorithm" as a "finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a
task").
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of functions previously implemented by the more concrete layers below. 3 8
To make matters even more complicated, abstraction layers often provide
multiple distinct implementations and interpretations of a single function,
using a versatile programming technique known as "indirection." 3 9 For
example, the FreeBSD operating system uses indirection to implement a
single "read system call" operation on disparate file-system organizations
such as those in PC hard drives, CD-ROMs, and USB sticks.4 0
In sum, because of this multilayered, multiply interpreted approach to
implementation, there is usually no single algorithm that can be said to
constitute the "structure, material, or acts" 41 that support the functionality of a software-related invention. Lemley's proposal that the scope of
functional elements in software patent claims "be limited to [disclosed]
algorithms and equivalents thereof" therefore does not provide adequate
guidance to the Patent Office or the courts for construing means-plusfunction claims under § 112(f). 42
The Federal Circuit actually stated a rule along the lines of Lemley's
proposal in its 1999 WMS Gaming decision. 43 In that case, the district
court construed a "means for assigning" limitation to cover "any table,
formula or algorithm" for performing the functional assignment in question. 44 The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court
"erred by failing to limit the claim to the algorithm disclosed in the specification." 4 5 The appeals court held that "[i]n a means-plus-function claim
in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or microprocessor,
programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the
general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer
programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm." 46 Accordingly, the
"means for assigning" limitation had to be construed narrowly according
to the algorithm illustrated in the specification. 47
Lemley's article praises the post-Bilski progeny of WMS Gaming,4 8
38. See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 2-4
(1976).
39. See Diomidis Spinellis, Another Level of Indirection, in BEAUTIFUL CODE: LEADING PROGRAMMERs EXPLAIN How THEY THINK 279-91 (Andy Oram & Greg Wilson, eds.
2007). Indirection is such a versatile approach to abstracting away implementation details
that the claim that "[a]ll problems in computer science can be solved with another layer of
indirection" has become a well-known aphorism among programmers. See id. at 279.
40. See id. at 279-82.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
42. See Lemley, supra note 6.
43. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
44. See id. at 1348.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1349 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

47. See id.
48. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 954 (concluding that functional software claims that
fail to disclose a supporting algorithm "are (and should be) invalid under Aristocrat"); id.
at 926 & n.88 (noting with approval that "the Federal Circuit has of late been quite vigilant
in limiting software patentees who write claims in means-plus-function format to the particular algorithms that implement those claims," and citing Aristocrat and other cases); id.

at 949 & n.183 (same).
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particularly the Federal Circuit's 2008 Aristocrat decision. 49 In Aristocrat,
the patentee conceded that the only disclosed structural support for a
recited means-plus-function limitation was "any standard microprocessor
base [sic] gaming machine [with] appropriate programming."5 0 The Federal Circuit cited a restatement of the WMS Gaming holding that "the
corresponding structure for a § 112[(f)] claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification."5 1 Finding
"no algorithm at all disclosed in the specification" of the Aristocrat patent, the court concluded that the means-plus-function limitation lacked
sufficient structural support and was therefore invalid for
indefiniteness. 52
Lemley's proposal is grounded in his concern that the Federal Circuit
has not strictly followed Aristocrat in requiring the disclosure of an algorithm as structural support for a recited function. He notes that the
Federal Circuit has sometimes been satisfied with finding structural support in "fairly general language rather than a specific implementation." 5 3
Moreover, when claim drafters have avoided explicitly using the term
"means" by claiming structures capable of performing a recited function
such as "a computer," "a processor," or "the Internet," the Federal Circuit has tended not to apply § 112(f) at all, effectively conferring "control
over the claimed function" regardless of the disclosure or nondisclosure
of structural support. 54
In the closing paragraphs of its decision, the Alappat majority famously
reasoned that "a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
55
pursuant to instructions from program software." Interestingly, this
logic underpins both the holding of WMS Gaming and (according to
Lemley) the Federal Circuit's failure to apply § 112(f) to functional elements where computing structures are recited. The WMS Gaming court
inferred from Alappat that "[t]he structure of a microprocessor programmed to carry out an algorithm is limited by the disclosed algorithm," insofar as "[t]he instructions of the software program that carry out the
algorithm electrically change the general purpose computer by creating
electrical paths within the device." 5 6 Lemley, however, argues that "[b]y
concluding that a general-purpose computer was a new machine whenever it was programmed with new instructions, the Federal Circuit
49. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty. Ltd. V. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
50. See id. at 1333 (alterations in original).
51. See id. (citing Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
52. See id. at 1337-38.
53. Lemley, supra note 6, at 949 & n.184 (citing Typhoon Techs. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Litig., 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2011)).
54. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 927 & n.89 (citing Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp
Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
55. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
56. See WMS Gaming Ins. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d at 1339, 1348 (citing Alappat,
33 F.3d at 1545).
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opened the door to treating a programmed computer as physical structure rather than as a functional claim that had to be interpreted under
section 112(f).""
Overlooked in this too-pat reading of Alappat is the fact that the
court's construction of the claims in question under § 112(f) did not involve the essentially metaphysical proposition that programming creates
a new machine-i.e., a proposition concerning the § 101 subject-matter
eligibility of a programmed computer that CLS Bank has recently called
into doubt.5 8 I will now discuss what Alappat actually had to say on the
subject of claim construction under § 112(f).
III.

READING ALAPPAT AS A § 112 PRECEDENT

In Alappat, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Patent Office's rejection
of five claims, four of which were dependent from the first.5 9 The representative claim read:
15. A rasterizer for converting vectors in a data list representing
sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means
comprising:
(a) means for determining a vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining an elevation of a row of pixels
that is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a
predetermined function of the normalized vertical distance
and elevation.6 0
Construing this claim in accordance with § 112(f), the court replaced
each of the four "means" terms in clauses (a)-(d) with what it determined
to be the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification:
15. A rasterizer [a "machine"] for converting vectors in a data list
representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into antialiased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means comprising:
(a) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining a vertical distance between the endpoints of each of the
vectors in the data list;
(b) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value function, or an equivalent thereof] for determin57. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 927-28 n.89 (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545).
58. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (Lourie, J. concurring) (per curiam).
59. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1538-39.
60. Id.
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ing an elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by the
vector;
(c) [a pair of barrelshifters, or equivalents thereof] for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) [a read only memory (ROM) containing illumination intensity data, or an equivalent thereof] for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined function of the
normalized vertical distance and elevation. 6 '
Having construed Claim 15 narrowly in accordance with these structural limitations, the court reasoned that the claim "unquestionably recites a machine, or apparatus, made up of a combination of known
electronic circuitry elements." 62 Observing that a "machine" is explicitly
recognized as patent-eligible subject matter under § 101, the court proceeded to use the conclusion from its § 112(f) analysis-that Claim 15
recites a machine-as the starting point for its § 101 analysis. 63
On the other hand, the Alappat court's § 112(f) claim-construction
analysis is both rhetorically and logically unconnected to the court's later
observation that a general-purpose computer, once programmed, becomes a new machine. The latter observation was a response to the patentee's admission that Claim 15 would read on a programmed general
purpose computer, not a finding by the court concerning the scope of
Claim 15.64 To summarize, the Alappat majority's § 112(f) analysis informs its § 101 analysis, not-as WMS Gaming's and Lemley's glosseS65
suggest-the other way around.
Thus, the WMS Gaming court's description of Alappat's § 112(f) analysis as based on a finding that "[t]he instructions of the software program
that carry out the algorithm electrically change the general purpose computer by creating electrical paths within the device," 66 is simply revisionism. The Alappat majority made no mention of "electrical paths" being
created through programming. Its § 112(f) analysis was instead appropriately grounded in the structural nature of the disclosed elements that it
determined to correspond to each of the claimed "means" terms: arithmetic logic circuits, a barrel shifter, and a read-only memory.67
A close examination of Alappat's patent specification also illuminates
what (I have suggested elsewhere 68) is the sine qua non of a structural
element: its involvement in a causal process. As Table 1 illustrates, Alappat discloses several explicitly causal processes that together produce the
61. Id. at 1541.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1541-42.
64. See id. at 1544-45.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
66. See WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int'1 Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545).
67. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541.
68. See Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 74 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 57-59 (2013) (discussing Centricut, LLC v. Esab Grp., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
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functions of the claimed machine, including processes respectively involving the disclosed arithmetic logic circuit (the "ALU"), barrel shifters, and
the read-only memory.
Disclosed
Element

Disclosed Causal Process

arithmetic

"[V]arious operations of rasterizer 40 . . . are timed by

logic circuit

clock signals produced by a state machine in accordance
with control data ... One signal is a 'pixel clock' signal that
is asserted to cause the rasterizer to receive each new
vector list data element .... This [ALU] value is stored in a
register 76 on the next pixel clock cycle." 69

barrel shifter

"[P]riority encoder 86 causes barrel shifter 84 to shift its
input to the left by the number of bits required .

read-only
memory

.70
...

"The 8-bit intensity data stored in register 90 addresses a
read only memory (ROM) 92 and causes ROM 92 to read
out a 4-bit intensity data value which is stored in a register
94 on the next pixel clock cycle." 7 '

Table 1. Causal processes involving each of the disclosed structural
elements supporting Claim 15.
IV.

A FRIENDLY AMENDMENT

As I have noted, WMS Gaming's gloss on Alappat implicitly appeals to
the view that an alteration in "electrical paths" amounts to a structural
change; 72 however, such a view is not necessarily intuitive.7 3 In my view,
the reason such changes in the flow of electrons are cognizable as structural support for a claimed "means" is that they are the effects of causal
processes.
Of course, the electrons that animate Alappat's rasterizer and today's
computers are creatures of theoretical physics; they have never been directly observed.74 Patentees cannot exhibit infringing electrons at trial.
Yet it is routine, and not at all problematic, for patent claims to refer to
electrons. This is because the theory of the electron is so well-developed
and widely-accepted that scientists can make and use electricity and other
observable effects of electrons without worrying about whether electrons
69. U.S. Patent No. 5,440,676 cols.3-4 (filed Jan. 29, 1988) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at col.6 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at cols.6-7 (emphasis added).
72. See supra text accompanying note 56.
73. Cf In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "a transitory,
propagating signal" falls outside the scope of patentable subject matter).
74. See generally THEODORE ARABATZIs, REPRESENTING ELECTRONS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO THEORETICAL ENTITIES (2006) (providing a history of theoretical representations of the electron as an unobservable entity).
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actually exist.7 5 A claimed invention that purports to use certain effects of
electrons can therefore be patentable. So long as scientists understand
how to produce and harness those effects in practice, there is an adequate
causal account of the invention's utility. As the Supreme Court declared
in Diamond v. Diehr, "It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted." 76
What allows the theory of electrons to incorporate such a "practical
method or means" is our general agreement, for all practical purposes, on
what the causal properties of electrons are. In fact, the causal properties
of electrons are so fundamental to our modern worldview that they are
regarded by many philosophers as metaphysically necessary laws of nature.77 On this view, all accounts of causal interactions involving electrons
are grounded in the essential properties of electrons.
Not all notions of causation are so firmly grounded. Increases in gas
prices cause reductions in driving, education causes reductions in poverty
and crime, and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand is regarded as the immediate cause of World War I. But few observers would
suggest these causal relationships are of the kind that could give rise to
patentable inventions.
In the spirit of a friendly amendment to Lemley's proposal, I propose
the following "concrete causation" standard for supporting "structure"
under § 112(f):
For a disclosed element to be deemed structural,its involvement in supporting a recited function must be amenable to explanation by a single
causal account specifying the resources brought into play (even though
such an account need not be known to or submitted by the patent
applicant).7 8
In Diehr's terms, I believe this grounding in real-world resource considerations is what should be required of any "practical method or means"
of achieving such an effect. 79 Here I use "resources" broadly to refer to
any manipulable quantities that have a well-defined causal role generally
accepted by practitioners, including physical quantities such as mass, energy, charge, and momentum; and real-time computational resources
such as CPU cycles, network bandwidth, memory, disk space, and battery
life. Causal accounts may employ a similarly broad range of explanatory
principles governing the involvement of such resources in causal
processes, ranging from the conservation laws of physics to the scheduling
75. See BRIAN ELLIS, SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 146 (2001) ("If the world behaves as if
things like atoms and electrons exist, then the best explanation of this fact is that they
really do exist.").
76. 450 U.S. 175, 183 n.7 (1981) (citing Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854)).
77. See ELLIS, supra note 75, at 6 (arguing that an electron must "generate [certain
gravitational and electromagnetic] fields in any world in which it might exist, and have
precisely the same effects on things of just the same kinds").
78. A patent applicant has no duty to disclose a correct theory of operation. See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
79. See 450 U.S. at 183 n.7 (citing Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1954)).
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disciplines implemented in operating systems.80 (As my gas price example
suggests, I would exclude notions of economic causation from this picture, but that is a discussion for another time.)
V.

CONCLUSION

While my proposal is applicable to all technologies, it would have an
especially salutary impact on the problematic software field. Many other
commentators have highlighted the apparent ability of artfully drafted
software patent claims to evade the abstract-ideas exclusion, but have
failed to propose a standard of concreteness that the specification of a
patentable software invention must meet.81 In my view, the most problematically abstract computer-related inventions are those whose results
are consequences of mathematics, logic, and semantics, and are therefore
indifferent as to the computational resources that may be involved in
their implementation.
For example, the commodity-hedging methods the Supreme Court
found unpatentable in Bilski v. Kappos consist of two kinds of steps: "initiating a series of transactions" and "identifying market participants." 8 2
The "initiating" steps can be correctly implemented through any kind of
process capable of being given legal effect, from paper documents, to recorded phone conversations (the primary approach at the time of Bilski's
invention),8 3 to HTTP requests via the Internet. The "identifying" steps
are specified in purely mathematical terms without regard to the computational resources that might be involved in their implementation.8 4 The
utility of Bilski's claimed methods is therefore not amenable to one resource-specific causal account, but to many: Bilski's methods perform
their hedging functions whether the market participants' option values
are calculated on my office desktop PC or on the London Science Museum's Difference Engine, and whether their transactions are completed
via telephone or website. A patent examiner could simply cite such an
observation in rejecting Bilski's claims as directed to unpatentable subject
matter.
My proposed standard of patentable concreteness would be consistent
with Supreme Court precedent85 and could be introduced through either
decisional law or legislation. Its universal applicability conforms to our
treaty obligations to make patents available without discrimination as to
the field of technology, which bodes well for its prospects as an interna80. Cf

PHIL

DowE,

PHYSICAL CAUSATION

89 (2000) ("[I]t is the possession of a con-

served quantity . . . that makes a process a causal process.").

81. See supra Part I.
82. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232-33 (2010).
83. See FLETCHER J. STunm, TRADING NATURAL GAS 28-29 (1997) (describing natural gas trading by telephone).
84. See U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892, at A-5 (filed Apr. 10, 1997), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/sol/2007-1130bilskijoint-appendix.pdf.
85. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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tional norm.86 Finally, it upholds what I have identified elsewhere as the
patent system's deep metaphysical commitment to scientific realism.87
By design, my proposal explicitly acknowledges that all of the "useful
Arts" confront the common problem of having limited resources (in their
most general sense) with which to satisfy limitless human desires.88 This
necessity is, after all, the mother of invention.89 Conscientious programmers and software engineers have acknowledged as much through their
attention to the increasingly diverse set of computational complexity concerns that have long suffused and ennobled the discipline of computer
science. 90 The patent system exists for those working to do more with
less, not for those seeking to corner the market on such efforts.

86. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125,1869 U.N.T.S. 299, at art. 27
(1994).
87. See Chin, supra note 68, at 5.
88. Cf Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 395 (1999) (describing
economics as "the study of rational choice under conditions of limited resources").
89. But see STACY V. JONES, INVENTIONS NECESSITY is NOT THE MOTHER OF: PATENTs RIDICULOUS AND SUBLIME (1975) (presenting examples of apparently unnecessary
patented inventions).
90. See SANJEEv ARORA & BOAZ BARAK, COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY (2009)
(surveying diverse results in computational complexity theory).

